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1. introduction
The prohibition of anti-competitive agreements is one of the key compe-
tition-oriented regulations in the European Union and attaching importance 
to its effective enforcement is related to the awareness of the need to protect 
the economy from the harmful cartel-like agreements. Cartel monopoly appropri-
ating the market is a hidden phenomenon which means it is difficult to detected 
so its prevention appears to be a much more complicated task than fighting any 
other anticompetitive practices, including the abuse of a dominant position. It 
has been attempted in this paper to explain the reasons for establishing the il-
legal collusions and to answer the question what makes them constitute such 
a great threat for other participants of economic relations that they are pursued 
and punished with the whole severity of the law.
The traditional measures aimed at protecting the market and taken by the Eu-
ropean Commission and by regional antimonopoly bodies, including the detailed 
studies of its segments and independent creation of evidentiary materials, are 
expensive and long-lasting and which is most important they do not give a full 
guarantee for the cartel to be detected and punished before it stops its activities. 
Implementation of leniency regulations has made the European Commission 
possess an innovative legal tool enabling a more effective enforcement of art. 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This pro-
gram was based on the experience of the states outside Europe (mainly the USA) 
and assumed the elimination of cartel agreements exploiting the market to be 
the paramount value. In the consequence the regulations have been introduced 
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which foresee the sanctions to be mitigated for the penitent businessmen who 
have participated in the illegal collusions, but they voluntarily give up the ille-
gal activity and get involved in an effective co-operation with the Commission’s 
services. In the course of time the leniency has become the main weapon at 
the Commission’s disposal for fighting the anticompetitive practices which has 
made other member states, including Poland, introduce it. 
The paper focuses mainly on the analysis of the influence of practical application 
of leniency institution on the effects of proceedings carried out by the European 
Commission and by the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection. 
Research thesis: the leniency program is a significant legal tool aimed at fight-
ing cartel-type agreements and besides, it plays a role of a preventive measure 
which effectively discourages the entrepreneurs from illegal collective activities 
aimed at maximizing profits in a dishonest way. The method which allows to 
prove the above thesis was the inquiry into the European and Polish literature 
regarding competition protection law, documents of the European Commission 
and the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection as well as the Eu-
ropean and Polish regulations including the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union.
2. competition rules on the market  
of the european Union
The single market covering member states constitutes the essential element of 
the European integration. It enables the integration to be tighter and much faster. 
It is all the more significant because of its being a regulator of economic processes 
occurring in the European Union which results from the functioning of a market-
oriented economy model. Then, such a type of economy is based on competition 
in the framework of which all economic subjects situated on the market [1] can 
compete with one another. It occurs when different entrepreneurs offer similar or 
identical products to the consumer at the same time and within the same territory. 
Because of the limited quantity of available resources for each market participant, 
the consumer can make his own choice among the offers presented to him. These 
differ from one another in respect of price, quality and other parameters. The mea-
surable effect of the competition between enterprises is price reduction, improve-
ment of product quality and, finally, the optimal allocation of resources [21].
In order to enable the correct functioning of competition, it is necessary 
to introduce some legal mechanisms aimed at protecting it from violations [4]. 
When creating the foundation for the European integration it was the priority 
to avoid substituting the removed trade barriers, including customs duties and 
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quantitative restrictions introduced by the state, with new ones. They would 
result from the excessive autonomy of enterprises or from the measures taken 
by the state. Therefore, it was assumed that the integration would be based on 
“the system ensuring undisturbed competition on the internal market”, which 
was mentioned under former art. 3 section 1 letter g of TWE [26]. In view of 
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice stating this regulation to be 
the directly binding legal norm, there emerged the need to create the basic 
competition rules [20]. Two main categories of these rules can be distinguished 
on the internal market, i.e.:
1. The rules aimed at enterprises and preventing them from collective or in-
dividual activities which could lead to competition disturbance. They cover 
preventing excessive concentration, prohibition of dominant position abuse 
and the prohibition of entering into anticompetitive agreements;
2. The rules aimed directly at member states whose goal is to eliminate the be-
havior which could lead to the violation of the rule of trading equality on 
the internal market, which also means a competition disturbance. This group 
covers the following: prohibition of the aid granted by member states out of 
their own means (the so called public aid) which is harmful for the market, 
and the requirement of matching the state of their own commercial monopo-
lies to the market conditions in order to ensure equal chances in the access 
to supplies and market [1].
2.1. cartel agreements within the european Union
In 2008 the Commissions services decided to make the valuation of losses 
suffered by the economy in the consequence of cartel activities. 18 cartels were 
surveyed which were the object of proceedings in the period 2005–2007, taking 
the size of objective markets and the time of the existence of cartels into con-
sideration. Prudent assumptions were also made regarding the estimated prices 
inflated by them ranging from 5 to 15 per cent, which means that the loss caused 
by the above mentioned cartels ranged from 4 to 11 billion EUR. It has been de-
cided to assume the average value, i.e. 10 per cent which determines the amount 
of losses borne by consumers to be as much as 7,6 billion EUR. When analyzing 
the economic literature according to which the prices were inflated by cartels by 
20–25 per cent, it can be found that the amount calculated by the Commission’s 
services is seriously lowered [22]. Consumer losses resulting from cartel activities 
reach a shocking size like those borne by other enterprises, which can be shown 
by analyzing particular examples of illegal market agreements cartels broken by 
the European Commission or competition protection bodies of member states.
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LCD cartel participated by six companies acting on the European market, inter 
alia Samsung and LG Display, was a clear example of cartel collusion which caused 
losses to consumers and to the companies acting honestly. The companies were 
regulating the prices of displays mounted in TV sets and telephones in the period 
from October 2001 up to February 2006 and faced the allegation of the European 
Commission of acting to the disadvantage of consumers and the fine in total 
amount of 649 million EUR. The cartel arranged price ranges, minimum prices, 
and exchanged information on production plans and future prices which was to 
the disadvantage of the enterprises not participating in the agreement [12].
A specific example of a cartel-type agreement is the resolution taken by 
the Polish National Notarial Council (a self-governmental body of notaries) in 
2002 which introduced the provision into the moral code stating that attract-
ing customers by proposing a lower price constitutes a glaring violation of 
vocational moral rules. It meant that a notary could not propose a lower price 
to the customer than the maximum price given in the ministerial decree, and 
without any disciplinary consequences. It caused the maximum rates to be 
the only compulsory ones which has totally eliminated the price competition, 
i.e. the most important one on the market of notary services. The lawmaker has 
purposely established the upper limit of the price for notary services taking into 
account the significance of social accessibility to their services. The resolution of 
the Notarial Council obliging all its members to use the maximum remuneration 
secured the interest of this group. Because of identical rate it was not important 
for the customer whose services to use and that situation implies deterioration 
of service quality comprising competent service, working time of notary public or 
the location of the notary’s office. The resolution has been found to be contrary 
to competition law [31].
The agreement between the operator of a section of A4 toll road Katowice 
–Kraków with some selected enterprises was aimed at ensuring them exclusivity 
for providing road assistance services in particular sections of the highway. The au-
thorized entrepreneurs were appointed by way of an offer of competition based 
on unclear rules. Arrangements with the traffic police were made whereby it was 
declared that the operator had concluded agreements with four road assistance 
companies which would be the only ones to be called to any events occurring on 
the highway. The consequence of the above agreement is very harmful for drivers 
(consumers) as the exclusivity- based authorized enterprises establish higher prices 
for their road assistance services than under normal market conditions. It forces 
the holders of uninsured cars or those who have a policy but do not want to make 
use of it, to use the services offered for an inflated price. The second consequence 
of the similar nature is the increase of insurance policy price which is determined 
taking into account many factors including road assistance costs [11].
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Fighting cartels is in the interest of all market participants and the whole 
economy, as they lead, in a longer period of time, to a drop of competitiveness 
and employment reduction [7]. Elimination of illegal collusions belongs to the pri-
orities of the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission 
and of national competition protection bodies. However, it is a very difficult task. 
Detection of a cartel and proving infringement to the entrepreneurs participat-
ing in it, is not an easy task, as for obvious reasons the parties to the forbidden 
agreement try to hide its existence [10].
3. Leniency – origins, scope and assumptions  
of the program
The first leniency program was introduced by the US Justice Department in 
1978. However, it was not very effective and only a small number of reports were 
received which made it impossible to fight cartels. The old version of the program 
was modified as late as 1993 by introducing a very important amendment admit-
ting an automatic remission of a penalty for the entrepreneur who is the first 
to disclose cartel existence and provides information about it. This amendment 
brought the desired effect whereby a large increase of the received applications 
was reported (in the period 1993–1999 the number of applications increased 
by twentyfold as compared to the period of 1978–1993). The attractiveness of 
the American leniency program was also raised by the fact that the local entre-
preneurs knew what penalty reduction they could count on before launching 
co-operation with the antimonopoly body.
Success of the American antimonopoly body in fighting cartels brought an 
effect in the form of a great interest of other countries in leniency. Australia, 
South Korea and Canada decided to copy the American concept as early as in 
the nineties. In Europe it was the European Commission which initiated it as first 
in 1996. The first EU leniency program was based on the Commission’s Notice 
on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. These cases were 
related to the activities which were in conflict with the EU law and covered illegal 
agreements and practices aimed at reducing the competition within the internal 
market [7]. The above act ceased to be binding six years later when it was sub-
stituted with the new Notice in 2002 [14]. The presently functioning leniency 
program for penitent participants of cartel collusion is based on the Notice of 
2006 [13]. Program efficiency expressed by the data received from the European 
Commission and the USA and other countries made Germany and the United King-
dom decide to implement leniency oriented regulations into their legal systems 
in 2000. Later the group the countries using the program was joined by France, 
Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
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Cyprus and Poland. Legal regulations on which the functioning of leniency is 
based in particular countries are contained in the detailed notices or directives 
issued by competent bodies which have been based on the laws on competition 
protection or fall within the scope thereof [7]. However, they are systematically 
matched to the model leniency program approved by the Commission and by 
national antimonopoly bodies of member states.
Even though the program was successful in the United States the European 
Commission developed a different policy. The most important differences between 
the US and the European Union program are as follows (Table 1):
table 1
Key differences between US and EU Leniency program
United States european Union
the first company which reports gets 
100% amnesty
The first company gets only a partial amnesty
fine reduction does not depend on 
the evidence provided
fine reduction strictly depends on the evi-
dence provided.
the second company which reports 
gets no reduction at all
fine reduction is also intended for other self 
reporting companies.
individual leniency is possible no individual leniency for managers or other 
employees is possible
leniency applications to the Antitrust 
Division are privileged under the US law
the European Commission may disclose the ev-
idence to national court of any member state
full immunity can also be granted if 
the case is already under investigation
maximum fine reduction of 50% is granted if 
the case is already under investigation
granting immunity from fines is auto-
matic
granting immunity from fines is dependent 
on the value of submitted information
Source: [3, 27]
The objective scope of the European Commission’s leniency program covers 
the agreements determined under art. 101 TFEU [25]; in Poland it is regulated 
by art. 6 section 1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition and Consumers. 
The subjects authorized to enjoy the benefits offered within leniency are the par-
ticipants of a cartel agreement, however, the fine reduction depends on meeting 
numerous conditions which will be described below in this section.
The anti-cartel program assumes an increase of entrepreneurs’ awareness of 
the risk related to participation in a cartel. Due to its introduction there is no col-
lusion, even the best organized and carefully concealed one, to give a full guaran-
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tee of impunity. The essence of the whole undertaking is to encourage informing 
against other partners in order to avoid fines, so it can be said that the assumptions 
of leniency are similar to those of another institution functioning within the law, 
i.e. the institution of crown witness which used to face distrust but today it has 
become an important tool for fighting the organized crimes. Another similarity 
between the above mentioned legal measures is constituted by the fact that both 
cartel collusion and an organized criminal group are difficult to be broken up in 
another way than by hitting its unity and solidarity. Moreover, the leniency pro-
gram was intended to trigger rivalry among collusion participants in submitting 
applications. It is fastness and efficiency that matters as only the first entrepreneur 
may count on full fine remission. Practice shows the matters to happen where 
each day and hour of delay in submitting application with antimonopoly body, 
is decisive. The entrepreneur who joins the program later may only count on a 
partial reduction of the fine, although it also seems attractive in the light of loss 
of 10 per cent of the annual revenues [9].
4. Leniency program in the light  
of european commission Notice of 2006
The Notice of the European Commission which has been in force since 2006 
determines the framework of rewarding the co-operation of cartel participants (en-
trepreneurs participating in the agreement prohibited by virtue of art. 101 TFEU), 
who, due to their activity, exerted an influence on the functioning of the internal 
market. According to its provision it is in the interest of all the citizens of the Euro-
pean Union to reward any initiative aimed at a voluntary withdrawal from a cartel. 
Moreover, the Commission finds the co-operation of an enterprise in respect of 
detecting the existence of a collusion to be very valuable. Its contribution to the ini-
tiation of legal proceedings or to the establishing of a violation may be a factor 
which justifies the immunity from any fines, provided that certain complementary 
requirements are met. It should be stressed that immunity from fines may cover only 
one subject. Co-operation of one or several enterprises can be regarded as the jus-
tification for the reduction of a fine. Any fine reduction is directly proportional to 
the real contribution of a subject covering the time of co-operation and its quality 
for the Commission in respect of establishing the existence of a cartel. Reduction 
of a fine may be offered to those enterprises which provided the evidence comple-
mentary to the materials already possessed and, at the same time, increasing their 
value as a whole. However, it should be noticed that both immunity from and reduc-
tion of the fine resulting from the participation in leniency program do not protect 
the enterprise from civil sanctions related to the violation of the competition law.
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According to the Notice an enterprise can provide the Commission with 
the already existing documents and a free description of its knowledge of the car-
tel and its participation therein. Such a description is prepared and submitted 
in the framework of the leniency program. According to the Commission such 
solutions have proved useful from the point of view of proceedings efficiency 
and elimination of cartels. The possibility of submitting voluntary explanations 
should not be substituted with order of disclosing the information which is is-
sued in civil legal actions. Such a status could effectively discourage enterprises 
from co-operating with the Commission within the framework of the Notice, as 
the potential program participants would regard their situation in the civil legal 
proceedings to be worse than that of other enterprises which were not prone for 
co-operation. The eventual consequence of introducing the order would affect 
the widely understood public interest which assumes the efficient enforcement 
of art. 101 TFEU by public authorities in the matters concerning cartel-type 
agreements which in turn is connected with the inefficient enforcement of these 
regulations in the framework of private actions. Testimonies given before the Com-
mission are subject to strict protection but it does not mean that the prohibition 
of disclosing them to the addressees of reported charges in order to ensure their 
right of defense. The entrepreneurs may view the files of a given case in the Com-
mission’s headquarters upon submitting their objections. Moreover, the declara-
tion given by enterprises are transmitted to the public bodies for competition 
protection in the framework of co-operation within the European Competition 
Network which tackles the matters of cartels acting in the area of their domestic 
markets. The Commission tackles those collusions which are functioning in at 
least three member states [6].
The issued notice determining the rules of the leniency program application 
and participation describes precisely the requirements qualifying for two catego-
ries of sanction mitigation which are functioning within the program. The first of 
the categories which foresees the possibility of making maximum use of the benefits 
offered within the leniency program resulting in the immunity from the fine, has 
been regulated under section II A of the Notice. As already mentioned, the basic 
condition for the fine to be remitted is the informant’s priority in transmitting 
the evidence of the existence of a cartel influencing the EU internal market; addi-
tionally, this evidence must be important enough to enable specific inspection to 
be carried out at the enterprises in connection with the alleged cartel activity, or to 
enable the violation of treaty regulations to be detected. In order to carry out an in-
spection by virtue of the law, the co-operating entrepreneur must provide the Com-
mission with the information and evidence materials which cover the following:
– The entrepreneur’s statement containing the following information, if known 
to the entrepreneur when submitting the application:
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1. A precise description of a cartel’s alleged practices covering its goals, activi-
ties and way of functioning, the products or services covered by the cartel, 
its geographical scope, duration of the cartel and the estimated size of 
the market influenced by the alleged agreement, the detailed informa-
tion on the dates and participants of contacts regarding the cartel and, 
additionally, any explanations in the framework of evidence of any items 
of importance attached to the application;
2. Name and address of the legal entity applying for the immunity from 
the fine and the names and addresses of all the entrepreneurs who belong 
or have belonged to the alleged collusion;
3. Personal data, functions, business or home addresses of natural persons 
(if necessary) who, according to the applicant’s knowledge participated 
in the alleged cartel, including the persons on the side of the applicant;
4. Information related to the alleged cartel on the basis of which the entre-
preneur has addressed or intends to address other antimonopoly bodies 
in or outside the European Union;
– Other evidence materials related to the alleged collusion which are in direct 
possession of the applying entrepreneur or are available to him at the mo-
ment of submitting the application; they cover especially the evidence from 
the period when particular events occurred.
Providing the materials enabling a control of participants of the alleged 
cartel or detection of the violation of the Treaty of the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union does not give a full guarantee of avoidance of the fine. According to 
the Commission’s decision immunity from the fine shall not be applied towards 
the applicant who disclosed the evidence authorizing for an inspection, if on 
the date of his application for lenience program participation the Commission 
was entitled to carry out such an inspection in the light of the evidence which 
had already been in its possession or such an inspection had already been carried 
out. Moreover, the immunity from the fine shall be applied when three following 
conditions are jointly met:
– On the date of application the Commission did not have sufficient evidence 
materials to establish the violation of art. 101 TFEU;
– No other entrepreneur has been offered the conditional immunity from 
the fines, i.e. no other subject has been covered by the leniency program on 
the grounds of the evidence transmitted to the Commission before the pro-
ceedings in the same case is launched [7].
– The entrepreneur has provided the charging materials and was the first to 
submit the declaration to the Commission.
Apart from meeting all the above conditions, according to the Commission’s 
requirements, the enterprise should definitely obey the additional directives 
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regarding the co-operation in explaining the cartel affair. In order to be qualified 
for immunity from the fine it must co-operate in a truthful, complete and continu-
ous way beginning from the moment of submitting the application and within 
the framework of the procedure carried out by the Commission. The enterprise 
is obliged to give precise not misleading and incomplete information. According 
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice the reduction of fine on the basis of 
a communication regarding the co-operation is justified only if the behavior of 
the enterprise could be the evidence of its real will of co-operation [30]. Accord-
ing to the above said it should include the following:
– Transmitting any important information and evidence available for the en-
terprise related to the alleged cartel to the Commission,
– Remaining at the Commission’s disposal in order to give answer to any ques-
tions asked by the Commission,
– Enabling the Commission to question its current of former employees of any 
rank,
– Disclosing the full content of any available evidence items,
– Concealing the fact of submitting the application and its content up to the mo-
ment of issue of the Commissions allegations in writing; additionally event 
the intention of submitting the application must be kept secret.
What is more, the entrepreneur is obliged to withdraw from the cartel on 
the date of launching the co-operation at the latest, unless the Commission’s deci-
sion states otherwise, finding it undesirable in the light of an efficient inspection 
at the alleged cartel participants. The last condition of the remission of the fine is 
the lack of the status of a cartel initiator. It means that the entrepreneur who sub-
mits the application could not be a subject inclining other to enter into the cartel 
collusion [7]. Otherwise, he is only entitled to apply for a reduction of the fine.
5. Leniency program in the practice of the Office  
for the protection of competition and consumers
The leniency program functions within the Polish legal system on the basis 
of the following acts:
– Law of 16 February 2007 on the protection of competition and consumers 
[28];
– Decree of the Council of Ministers [19];
and other related documents:
– Explanatory Notes concerning the determination of fines for competition 
reducing practices [29];
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– Guidelines of the President of the Office for the Protection of Competition 
and Consumers regarding the leniency program [6].
The program is regulated by art. 109 section 1 and 2 of the Law on the Protec-
tion of Competition and Consumers. The Polish version of the leniency program 
was modeled after penalty mitigation programs which are functioning within 
the European legal systems, especially the regulations applied by the European 
Commission. The regulations related to the application of the leniency procedure 
by the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers cover numerous 
analogies as compared to the regulations contained in the above analyzed Com-
mission’s Notice.
On the basis of art. 109 of the Law, the Council of Ministers has issued a decree 
which is an executive act to the provisions of the Law. It defines the procedure 
in case an entrepreneur applies for participation in the program. Its provisions 
also specify the procedural requirements concerning the submission and con-
sideration of applications and the methods of notifying the entrepreneurs of 
the standpoint of the President of the Office for the Protection of Competition 
and Consumers (UOKiK). The detailed determination of the conditions of leni-
ency program is to guarantee the possibility of carrying out the detailed analysis 
and a fair assessment of meeting the requirements by the subjects involved to 
be covered by penalty mitigation program [7]. What is more, the regulations 
added to the above mentioned decree by way of the amendment thereto of 2009 
enable the entrepreneurs to submit shortened applications [16]. In order to 
increase transparency of the regulations contained in the Law and the Decree, 
the President of the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers 
issued guidelines regarding leniency which constitute a practical manual for 
the entrepreneurs who want to participate in the program; however, they do 
not have legal status.
According to art. 109 of the Law [28], two forms are admitted for the lenient 
treatment of entrepreneurs by the President of the Office for the Protection of 
Competition and Consumers, i.e.:
– immunity from the fine;
– reduction of the fine.
Remission or reduction of the fine can be applied for by the entrepreneur who 
participated in an agreement covered by the catalogue of prohibited agreements 
according to art.6 of the Law on the protection of competition and consumers. 
As in the Commission’s program total remission of the fine can be enjoyed by 
one single subject which is the first to submit the application and to meet ad-
ditional conditions, while the reduction may be granted in the case of a larger 
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number of entrepreneurs. Reduction of the fine shall be granted in the following 
amounts:
– the second applicant to submit the application – reduction of the fine up to 
5 per cent of the annual revenues;
– the third applicant to submit the application – reduction of the fine up to 
7 per cent of the annual revenues;
– the remaining applicants – reduction of the fine up to 8 per cent of the an-
nual revenues;
6. results of the leniency program
According to more than ten years experience of the Commission in applying 
the penalty mitigation program has shown it to be an efficient tool for fighting 
cartels. In the course of time the number of entrepreneurs applying for leniency 
has successively been increasing which was undoubtedly the effect of subsequent 
amendments introduced into the regulations, aimed at increasing the efficiency 
of this institution. 
In the period 1998–2001 above 80 entrepreneurs accessed the program by 
virtue of the notice of 1996. In the same period the Commission made reference 
to the above mentioned notice in 16 out of 18 decisions in carte-related cases. 
In 2003 the Commission issued 4 decision based on the information provided 
within the leniency program, imposing fines for participants of the detected cartels 
exceeding 100 million EUR. The activities of these cartels covered the whole EU 
market for a significant period of time; it was even 28 years in one case. The en-
trepreneurs who informed about their existence have really deserved the remis-
sion or reduction of their fines.
The amendment to the notice of 2002 aimed at modernizing the program was 
very successful. Due to its introduction the Commission managed to raise the trust 
of entrepreneurs towards the leniency institution. Above 20 company representa-
tives were registered by the Commission’s contact points during the very first year 
of the new regulation being in force. Conditional waiver of imposing a fine was 
applied in more than ten cases, whole in the period 1996–2002 it was the case 
three times only [32]. In the course of time the leniency procedure was becoming 
more and more efficient which allowed the co-operating entrepreneurs to avoid 
fines amounting to millions or, sometimes, even hundreds of millions euro [3]. 
This tendency has been kept up-to-date enabling market collusions to be elimi-
nated and the budget of the European Union to be fed with billions of euro from 
the fines imposed on their participants.
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The potential of leniency can be best illustrated by analyzing the statistics of 
the European Commission regarding cartels [5]. The total amounts of fines im-
posed on entrepreneurs and the number of decisions in cartel cases in particular 
periods of time, have been presented below (Tables 2 and 3):
table 2
Fines imposed by European Commission
period Amount in euro
1995–1999 270 963 500.00
2000–2004 3 157 348 710.00
2005–2009 8 456 838 162.50
2010–2012 3 883 258 432.00
Total 16 112 691 354.50
Source: [3]
table 3
Number of decisions
period Undertakings
1995–1999 45
2000–2004 157
2005 -2009 203
2010–2012 112
Total 702
Source: [3]
It should be stressed that not all the cartels covered by the above statistics 
were detected and fined due to leniency applications. The Commission managed 
to eliminate some of them due to precise market studies and the effective work 
of its services which were collecting the evidence materials by themselves. How-
ever, it can be easily seen that the rising tendency has been kept in respect of 
the amounts of fines and number of decisions since the program was launched. 
The amendments to the leniency regulations of 2002 and 2006 and the aggrava-
tion of the antimonopoly policy have implied a further increase of revenues for 
the EU budget from the fines whose total amount increased by eleven fold in 
the period 2000–2004 (as compared to the period 1995–1999), and then it tripled 
within the period of 2005–2009. The fines imposed in 2010 only, reach the level 
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of nearly 30 per cent of the fines imposed within the preceding five years. The ris-
ing trend can be expected to be kept during next few years.
The list of ten cartels which have been fined most severely by the Commis-
sion in the history can be regarded as the interpretation of the program efficiency 
(Table 4):
table 4
Cartels fined most severely by European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/competition
Year case Amount in euro
2008 CAR GLASS – cartel of car glass manufacturers 1.383.896.000
2007 ELEVATORS AND ESCALATORS – cartel elevator & 
escalator manufacturers
832.422.250
2010 AIRFREIGHT – cartel created by air lines 799.445.000
2001 VITAMINS – cartel of vitamin manufacturers 790.515.000
2008 CANDLE WAXES – cartel paraffin manufacturers 676.011.400
2010 LCD – cartel LCD panel manufacturers 648.925.000
2009 GAS – German-French gas cartel 640.000.000
2010 BATHROOM FITTINGS – cartel of bathroom fit-
tings manufacturers
622.250.782
2007 GAS INSULATED SWITCHGEAR – cartel of gas 
insulated switchgear manufacturers
539.185.000
2006 SYNTHETIC RUBBER – cartel of synthetic rubber 
manufacturers
520.000.000
Source: [3]
It results from the open-access information disclosed by the Commission 
that the „active regret” institution has contributed to breaking up 9 of 10 above 
agreements (gas cartel was the only exception). Leniency applications brought to 
contact points revealed the activity of a cartel which had been unknown before, or 
they shortened proceedings duration when the Commission collected sufficient 
evidence for launching an inspection or explanatory proceedings, by itself. An 
analysis of the proceedings carried out and the decisions issued by the Commis-
sion with regard to several of the above mentioned cartels prove the efficiency 
of this institution and fully reflect its significance for the proper functioning of 
the EU internal market.
The origin of the Polish leniency program was not promising for that institu-
tion. New regulations of 2004 were supposed to bring revolutionary changes as 
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far as cartel fighting is concerned; unfortunately it did not happen immediately 
after their introduction. In the period 2004–2006 the President of the Office 
for the Protection of Competition and Consumers issued 53 decisions regard-
ing the anticompetitive agreements none of which however was supported by 
evidence materials collected within the leniency program. The Polish program 
did not live up to expectations, contrary to the system of sanction mitigation 
of the European Commission whose success was spectacular. It is a meaningful 
fact that during the first two years the Office received applications for the re-
mission or reduction of fines from four entrepreneurs. Moreover, the materials 
they provided did not contribute to any fine to be imposed on any enterprise. 
According to former President of Antimonopoly Office, prof. Anna Fornalczyk, 
such a state of things was caused by several factors such as reluctance towards 
any payable denunciations, low fines for cartel activities and inefficiency of 
the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers. In general opinion 
of the specialists the main reason of the failure were the gaps in the law. Any 
benefits offered to an entrepreneur depended on the good will of the officials 
which made him uncertain of the benefits to be enjoyed after acceding to leni-
ency program. According to many experts, another reason of a low number of 
program participants was a poor general knowledge of Polish entrepreneurs and 
a short time of binding force of the law [5]. However, in the course of time these 
circumstances have changed.
Next years brought a greater interest in the institution of penalty mitigation. 
In 2007 the Office received 7 applications and 5 applications in 2008. Another step 
ahead were the leniency regulations which came in force at the beginning of 2009 
in the form of a governmental decree, and the guidelines issued by the President 
of the Office constituting a kind of manual for entrepreneurs, which were worked 
out for one year (2008) [23]. They have introduced some significant simplifica-
tions and caused an increase of the number of the received applications [17, 8]. 
A promotion campaign was also carried out. According to the data as for 11 January 
2011 the contact points received in total 43 entrepreneurs 15 of whom submitted 
the shortened applications as they had already notified the European Commission 
before (they acted in a cartel covering at least three member states) [18].
The “Cement cartel” was the best known example of collusion the Office 
managed to break up using the institution of leniency [2]. Simultaneously, it 
was the largest anticompetitive agreement detected in the twenty year history of 
the Polish antimonopoly body. It was formed by the following enterprises: Lafarge 
Cement, Górażdże Cement, Grupa Ożarów, Cemex Polska, Dyckerhoff Polska, Ce-
mentownia Warta and Cementownia Odra, whose total market shares amounted to 
nearly 100 per cent. Seven of the above mentioned companies divided the market 
among themselves for a period of 11 years, establishing the among of shares for 
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each of the cartel participants. Minimum prices, amounts of price surges as well 
as the dates and order of their introduction. In order to coordinate their activities 
confidential trade information was exchanged concerning inter alia the volume of 
production and sales [24]. As a result of the cartel activities the prices were kept 
at an inflated level ranging from 4 to 13 per cent per annum at Polskie Składy 
Budowlane company [32].
A further development of the leniency program aimed at improving its results 
belongs to the most important priorities of the Office planned for the period 
2011–2013. It is the explicit evidence that the correct functioning of this institu-
tion is in the interest of the Office and of the Polish market. In order to ensure 
it, it is necessary to match a number of elements to one another which constitute 
the basis of the program and influence its results. These elements are especially 
the conditions and amount of reduction of the fine in view of the entrepreneur’s 
co-operation with the Office. In light of the above-said the Office has found it 
desirable to analyze the experience gained up to the present concerning the ap-
plication of leniency institution in the context of its legal construction, and, if 
necessary, to prepare its appropriate modification [15].
7. Summary
Fighting cartels is one of the most difficult tasks for antimonopoly bodies. 
Fifteen years of applying leniency program within the European Union has made 
this process easier, cheaper and faster. Statistics univocally show the number of 
the detected and broken anticompetitive agreements to grow. Thus, the “active 
regret” institution is the undertaking which has brought and will bring great 
successes. However, keeping a high level of its results will depend on matching 
the regulations comprised by it to the changing market conditions which may 
make it necessary to introduce a modification of its legal construction.
Leniency is a tool which enables both detection of a violation which has been 
unknown so far and fast completion of proceedings with a high probability of 
giving the correct jurisdiction. It is possible due to the domino effect frequently 
occurring in the program where one entrepreneur’s anonymous denunciation 
makes the remaining partners submit applications hastily which contributes to 
the collection of a rich evidence material concerning the matter and to imposing 
the fines which are adequate to the grade of violation. Implementation of leniency 
regulations on the grounds of Polish competition related policy will only bring 
the desirable effect when the entrepreneurs are guaranteed the legal certainty 
which is expressed by the transparency of the regulations, procedures and a 
strictly determined percentage of reduction of the imposed fine.
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